Old Gadfly: As we watch the theatrics between
President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu, there is obvious tension. Today Netanyahu delivers a speech before a
joint session of Congress, with a visible partisan boycott. Netanyahu has a different focus on legacy compared
to his counterpart. Netanyahu’s is
existential for the country he loves, while the other dreams of a transformed
America. Imagine a partisan boycott of a
President’s State of the Union address in response to an uberpresidency that
creates laws contrary to the enumerated powers of the Constitution. White House complaints about protocol seem to
be one-sided.
AM: The tension between heads of state
(notice I used heads of state as opposed to leaders—although I believe in the
grand scheme of things, Netanyahu is a leader) is a symptom of a more complex
relationship.
Old Gadfly: Good point, AM. Today, George Friedman published an
interesting analysis of the complex relationship within a broader historical
context. With permission, Friedman’s speech is
republished here.
Netanyahu, Obama and the Geopolitics of
Speeches
By
George Friedman
Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is visiting the United States this week to
speak to Congress on March 3. The Obama administration is upset that Speaker of
the House John Boehner invited Netanyahu without consulting with the White
House and charged Boehner with political grandstanding. Netanyahu said he was
coming to warn the United States of the threat of Iran. Israeli critics of
Netanyahu charged that this was a play for public approval to improve his
position in Israel's general election next year. Boehner denied any political
intent beyond getting to hear Netanyahu's views. The Obama administration
claimed that the speech threatens the fabric of U.S.-Israeli relations.
Let
us begin with the obvious. First, this is a speech, and it is unlikely that
Netanyahu could say anything new on the subject of Iran, given that he never
stops talking about it. Second, everyone involved is grandstanding. They are
politicians, and that's what they do. Third, the idea that U.S.-Israeli
relations can be shredded by a grandstanding speech is preposterous. If that's
all it takes, relations are already shredded.
Speeches
aside, there is no question that U.S.-Israeli
relations have been changing substantially since the end of the
Cold War, and that change, arrested for a while after 9/11, has created
distance and tension between the countries. Netanyahu's speech is merely a
symptom of the underlying reality. There are theatrics, there are personal
animosities, but presidents and prime ministers come and go. What is important
are the interests that bind or separate nations, and the interests of Israel
and the United States have to some extent diverged. It is the divergence of interests
we must focus on, particularly because there is a great deal of mythology
around the U.S.-Israeli relationship created by advocates of a close
relationship, opponents of the relationship, and foreign enemies of one or both
countries.
Building the U.S.-Israeli Relationship
It
is important to begin by understanding that the United States and Israel did
not always have a close relationship. While the United States recognized Israel
from the beginning, its relationship was cool until after the Six-Day War in
1967. When Israel, along with Britain and France, invaded Egypt in
1956, the United States demanded Israel's withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza, and
the Israelis complied. The United States provided no aid for Israel except for
food aid given through a U.N. program that served many nations. The United
States was not hostile to Israel, nor did it regard its relationship as
crucial.
This
began to change before the 1967 conflict, after pro-Soviet coups in Syria and
Iraq by Baathist parties. Responding to this threat, the United States created
a belt of surface-to-air missiles stretching from Saudi Arabia to Jordan and
Israel in 1965. This was the first military aid given to Israel, and it was
intended to be part of a system to block Soviet power. Until 1967, Israel's
weapons came primarily from France. Again, the United States had no objection
to this relationship, nor was it a critical issue to Washington.
The
Six-Day War changed this. After the conflict, the French, wanting to improve
relations with the Arabs, cut off weapons sales to Israel. The United States
saw Egypt become a
Soviet naval and air base, along with Syria. This threatened the
U.S. Sixth Fleet and other interests in the eastern Mediterranean. In
particular, the United States was concerned about Turkey because the Bosporus in Soviet hands would
open the door to a significant Soviet challenge in the Mediterranean and
Southern Europe. Turkey was now threatened not only from the north but also
from the south by Syria and Iraq. The Iranians, then U.S. allies, forced the
Iraqis to face east rather than north. The Israelis forced the Syrians to focus
south. Once the French pulled out of their relationship with Israel and the
Soviets consolidated their positions in Egypt and Syria in the wake of the
Six-Day War, the United States was forced into a different relationship with
Israel.
It
has been said that the 1967 war and later U.S. support for Israel triggered
Arab anti-Americanism. It undoubtedly deepened anti-American sentiment among
the Arabs, but it was not the trigger. Egypt became pro-Soviet in 1956 despite
the U.S. intervention against Israel, while Syria and Iraq became pro-Soviet
before the United States began sending military aid to Israel. But after 1967,
the United States locked into a strategic relationship with Israel and became
its primary source of military assistance. This support surged during the 1973
Arab-Israeli War, with U.S. assistance rising from roughly 5 percent of Israeli
gross domestic product to more than 20 percent a year later.
The
United States was strategically dependent on Israel to maintain a balance of
power in the eastern Mediterranean. But even during this period, the United
States had competing strategic interests. For example, as part of encouraging a
strategic reversal into the U.S. camp after the 1973 war, the United States
negotiated an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai that the Israelis were extremely
reluctant to do but could not avoid under U.S. pressure. Similarly, U.S.
President Ronald Reagan opposed an Israeli invasion of Lebanon that reached
Beirut, and the initial U.S. intervention in Lebanon was not against Arab
elements but intended to block Israel. There was a strategic dependence on
Israel, but it was never a simple relationship.
The
Israelis' national
security requirements have always outstripped their resources. They
had to have an outside patron. First it was the Soviets via Czechoslovakia,
then France, then the United States. They could not afford to alienate the
United States — the essential foundation of their national security — but
neither could they simply comply with American wishes. For the United States, Israel
was an important asset. It was far from the only important asset. The United
States had to reconcile its support of Israel with its support of Saudi Arabia,
as an example. Israel and the Saudis were part of an anti-Soviet coalition, but
they had
competing interests, shown when the United States sold airborne
warning and control systems to the Saudis. The Israelis both needed the United
States and chafed under the limitations Washington placed on them.
Post-Soviet Relations
The
collapse of the Soviet Union destroyed the strategic foundation for the
U.S.-Israeli relationship. There was no pressing reason to end it, but it began
to evolve and
diverge. The fall of the Soviet Union left Syria and Iraq without a
patron. Egypt's U.S.-equipped army, separated from Israel by a demilitarized
Sinai and token American peacekeepers, posed no threat. Jordan was a key ally
of Israel. The United States began seeing the Mediterranean and Middle East in
totally different ways. Israel, for the first time since its founding, didn't
face any direct threat of attack. In addition, Israel's economy surged, and
U.S. aid, although it remained steady, became far less important to Israel than
it was. In 2012, U.S. assistance ($2.9 billion) accounted for just more than 1
percent of Israel's GDP.
Both
countries had more room to maneuver than they'd had previously. They were no longer
locked into a relationship with each other, and their relationship continued as
much out of habit as out of interest. The United States had no interest in
Israel creating settlements in the West Bank, but it wasn't interested enough
in stopping them to risk rupturing the relationship. The Israelis were no
longer so dependent on the United States that they couldn't risk its
disapproval.
The
United States and Israel drew together initially after 9/11. From the Israeli
perspective, the attacks proved that the United States and Israel had a common
interest against the Islamic world. The U.S. response evolved into a much more
complex form, particularly as it became apparent that U.S. forces in
Afghanistan and Iraq were not going to
pacify either country. The United States needed a strategy that
would prevent jihadist attacks on the homeland, and that meant intelligence
cooperation not only with the Israelis but also with Islamic countries hostile
to Israel. This was the old problem. Israel wanted the United States focused on
Israel as its main partner, but the United States had much wider and more
complex relations to deal with in the region that required a more nuanced
approach.
This
is the root of the divergence on
Iran. From Israel's point of view, the Iranians pose an inherent
threat regardless of how far along they are — or are not — with their nuclear
program. Israel wants the United States aligned against Iran. Now, how close
Tehran is to a nuclear weapon is an important question, but to Israel, however
small the nuclear risk, it cannot be tolerated because Iran's ideology makes it
an existential threat.
The Iran Problem
From
the American perspective, the main question about Iran is, assuming it is a
threat, can it be destroyed militarily? The Iranians are not fools. They
observed the ease with which the Israelis destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in
1981. They buried theirs deep underground. It is therefore not clear,
regardless of how far along it is or what its purpose is, that the United
States could destroy Iran's nuclear program from the air. It would require, at
the very least, special operations on the ground, and failing that, military
action beyond U.S. capabilities. Aside from the use of nuclear weapons, it is
unclear that an attack on multiple hardened sites would work.
The
Israelis are quite aware of these difficulties. Had it been possible to attack,
and had the Israelis believed what they were saying, the Israelis would have
attacked. The distances are great, but there are indications that countries
closer to Iran and also interested in destroying Iran's nuclear program would
have allowed the use of their territories. Yet the Israelis did not attack.
The
American position is that, lacking a viable military option and uncertain as to
the status of Iran's program, the only option is to induce Iran to curtail the
program. Simply maintaining permanent sanctions does not end whatever program
there is. Only an agreement with Iran trading the program for an end of
sanctions would work. From the American point of view, the lack of a military
option requires a negotiation. The Israeli position is that Iran cannot be
trusted. The American position is that in that case, there are no options.
Behind
this is a much deeper issue. Israel of course understands the American argument.
What really frightens the Israelis is an emerging American strategy. Having
failed to pacify Afghanistan or Iraq, the United States has come to the
conclusion that wars of occupation are beyond American capacity. It is prepared
to use air power and very limited ground forces in Iraq, for example. However,
the United States does not see itself as having the option of bringing decisive
force to bear.
An Intricate U.S. Strategy
Therefore,
the United States has a double strategy emerging. The first layer is to keep
its distance from major flare-ups in the region, providing support but making
clear it will not be the one to take primary responsibility. As the situation
on the ground deteriorates, the United States expects these conflicts to
eventually compel regional powers to take responsibility. In the case of Syria
and Iraq, for example, the chaos is on the border of
Turkey. Let Turkey live with it, or let Turkey send its own troops
in. If that happens, the United States will use limited force to support them.
A similar dynamic is playing out with Jordan and the Gulf Cooperation Council
states as Saudi Arabia tries to assume responsibility for Sunni Arab interests
in the face of a U.S-Iranian entente. Importantly, this rapprochement
with Iran is already happening against the Islamic State, which is
an enemy of both the United States and Iran. I am not sure we would call what
is happening collaboration, but there is certainly parallel play between Iran
and the United States.
The
second layer of this strategy is creating a balance of power. The United States
wants regional powers to deal with issues that threaten their interests more
than American interests. At the same time, the United States does not want any
one country to dominate the region. Therefore, it is in the American interest
to have multiple powers balancing each other. There are four such powers:
Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Some collaborate, some are hostile, and
some shift over time. The United States wants to get rid of Iran's weapons, but
it does not want to shatter the country. It is part of a pattern of regional
responsibility and balance.
This
is the heart of Israel's problem. It has always been a pawn in U.S. strategy,
but a vital pawn. In this emerging strategy, with multiple players balancing
each other and the United States taking the minimum possible action to maintain
the equilibrium, Israel finds itself in a complex relationship with three
countries that it cannot be sure of managing by itself. By including Iran in
this mix, the United States includes what Israel regards as an unpredictable
element not solely because of the nuclear issue but because Iran's influence
stretches to Syria and Lebanon and imposes costs and threats
Israel wants to avoid.
This
has nothing to do with the personalities of Barack Obama and Benjamin
Netanyahu. The United States has shown it cannot pacify countries with
available forces. The definition of insanity is doing the same thing repeatedly
and expecting a different outcome. If the United States is not involved on the
ground in a conflict, then it becomes a problem for regional powers to handle.
If the regional powers take the roles they must, they should balance against
each other without a single regional hegemon emerging.
Israel
does not want to be considered by the United States as one power among many. It
is focused on the issue of a nuclear Iran, but it knows that there is no
certainty that Iran's nuclear facilities can be destroyed or that sanctions will
cause the Iranians to abandon the nuclear program. What Israel fears is an
entente between the United States and Iran and a system of relations in which
U.S. support will not be automatic.
So
a speech will be made. Obama and Netanyahu are supposed to dislike each other.
Politicians are going to be elected and jockey for power. All of this is true,
and none of it matters. What does matter is that the United States, regardless
of who is president, has to develop a new strategy in the region. This is the
only option other than trying to occupy Syria and Iraq. Israel, regardless of
who is prime minister, does not want to be left as part of this system while
the United States maintains ties with all the other players along with Israel.
Israel doesn't have the weight to block this strategy, and the United States
has no alternative but to pursue it.
This
isn't about Netanyahu and Obama, and both know it. It is about the
reconfiguration of a region the United States cannot subdue and cannot leave.
It is the essence of great power strategy: creating a balance of power in which
the balancers are trapped into playing a role they don't want. It is not a
perfect strategy, but it is the only one the United States has. Israel is not
alone in not wanting this. Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia don't want it, either.
But geopolitics is indifferent to wishes. It understands only imperatives
and constraints.
